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Abstract. It is generally believed that in a situation where individual and collective
interests are in conflict, the availability of optional participation is a key mechanism
to maintain cooperation. Surprisingly, this effect is sensitive to the use of microscopic
dynamics and can easily be broken when agents make a fully rational decision during
their strategy updates. In the framework of the celebrated prisoner’s dilemma game,
we show that this discrepancy can be fixed automatically if we leave the strict and
frequently artifact condition of a fully occupied interaction graph, and allow agents
to change not just their strategies but also their positions according to their success.
In this way, a diluted graph where agents may move offers a natural and alternative
way to handle artifacts arising from the application of specific and sometimes awkward
microscopic rules.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, evolution of cooperation, optional prisoner’s
dilemma, mobility
1. Introduction
Despite extensive research efforts, the evolution of cooperation remains a puzzle in a
wide range of domains [1, 2]. In this context, two-strategy games such as the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD) game have been widely studied for many years from different perspectives
with mechanisms [3] such as group selection [4] and network reciprocity [5, 6, 7]
investigated. Traditionally, the agents’ interactions in those games are compulsory, i.e.,
the agent has to opt between cooperation or defection, where the dilemma arises because
individual selfishness leads to a collective disaster [8, 9]. However, in many real-world
scenarios, the agents’ participation in the game is voluntary (optional). Thus, in order to
account for the concept of voluntary participation (abstention), researchers have been
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exploring the voluntary prisoner’s dilemma (VPD) game, also known as the optional
prisoner’s dilemma game, which extends the PD to a three-strategy game where agents
can also choose to abstain from playing the game [10, 11, 12]. In particular, abstention
has attracted attention both for acting as a mechanism to support cooperation and for
promoting cyclic behaviour [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. The cyclic dominance behaviour is
often studied within the bounds of the rock-paper-scissors game, which, different to the
VPD game, imposes the cyclic dominance in the payoff matrix [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24].
In addition to the discussion about the game strategies, studies concerning agent
mobility are also of interest because, in many real ecological systems, individuals are
usually on the move to improve their performance [25]. In this sense, research has shown
that in a spatial environment, mobility and percolation thresholds have a critical impact
on the sustenance of biodiversity in nature [19, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. Interestingly,
despite a large number of papers discussing the effects of mobility in the prisoner’s
dilemma [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37], the rock-paper-scissors [25, 38, 39] and the optional
public goods games [40, 41, 42], the impact of mobility in the context of the VPD game
is still almost unknown. Indeed, some effort has also been made to explore contingent
movement strategies modelling the so-called “win-stay, lose-move” rule, which, as also
argued by Szabo´ and Fa´th [5], might capture the concept of abstention in the sense
that agents abstain by moving away from their opponents [43, 44, 45, 46]. Although
this is a valid way to account for voluntary participation, we highlight that in many
scenarios there must be a cost (payoff) associated with the act of not playing the game,
i.e., abstention defined in terms of the set of game strategies rather than the movement
strategies. In other words, defining abstention as a strategy rather than a movement
ensures that all agents have the right to abstain from a game interaction, independently
of having a way to walk away (space permitting) or not.
Despite the very recent introduction of the VPD game in a diluted network with a
purely random mobility scenario [47], many questions regarding the impact of mobility,
in both the sustenance of biodiversity and the potential for widespread cooperation,
remain unanswered. For instance, given the recent advances in the understanding of
coevolutionary models [48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54], what happens to the population
when considering agent mobility in a coevolutionary fashion? Thus, without loss of
generality, this research introduces the VPD game with a coevolutionary model where
not only the agents’ strategies but also their movement is subject to the evolutionary
process, which provides a more realistic representation of mobility within the domain of
voluntary/optional participation.
Furthermore, we investigate the foundations of the emergence of cyclic dominance
for the VPD game in both the fully populated (without mobility) and diluted networks.
We discuss that the emergence of the cyclic dominance behaviour, which is commonly
associated with the VPD game, is very sensitive to the chosen imitation rule. Results
show that when using other imitation rules, the cyclic dominance can be broken easily,
but this difference diminishes when we use a more general diluted model where mobility
can repair the missing chain that is necessary to support cyclic dominance.
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
model and the experimental settings. Section 3 presents the results of the extensive
Monte Carlo simulations, which allow us to unveil the reason why mobility and
optionality favour cooperation and cyclic dominance. Finally, Section 4 outlines the
main conclusions.
2. Methods
In order to account for the features of the concept of voluntary participation (abstention)
and agent mobility, we consider a set of N rational agents playing the voluntary
prisoner’s dilemma game (also known as the optional prisoner’s dilemma game) on a
M ×M diluted square lattice network with von Neumann neighbourhood and periodic
boundary conditions, i.e., a toroid where sites are either empty or occupied by an
agent. In this way, to describe the lattice occupation, we define the lattice’s density
as ρ = N/M2 (0 < ρ < 1), where ρ = 1 means that the lattice is fully populated.
In the voluntary prisoner’s dilemma (VPD) game, agents can be designated as a
cooperator (C), defector (D) or abstainer (A). Considering a pairwise interaction, the
payoffs are defined as follows: D gets P = 0 for mutual defection, C gets R = 1 for
mutual cooperation, T = b for defection against a cooperator, and S = 0 for cooperation
against a defector. Regardless of whether one or two agents abstain, both agents get
the loner’s payoff L = σ, where R > L > P . Note that we adopt a weak version of the
game, where T > R > L > P ≥ S maintains the nature of the dilemma [7, 10].
We consider a randomly initialized population in which N/3 of each strategy (C,
D and A) is distributed at random in the network. Following the standard procedures
of an asynchronous Monte Carlo (MC) simulation in this context [55, 56], at each MC
time step, each agent (x) is selected once on average to update its strategy and position
immediately. Thus, in one MC step, N agents are randomly chosen to perform the
subsequent procedures: if the agent x has no neighbours, it moves to one of the four
nearest empty sites (von Neumann neighbourhood) at random; otherwise, the agent x
accumulates the utility Ux by playing the VPD game with all its nearest active (non-
empty) neighbours (Ωx), selects one of them at random (i.e., the agent y, which also
acquires its utility Uy), and considers copying its strategy with a probability given by
the Fermi-Dirac distribution function:
W =
1
1 + e(Ux−Uy)/K
(1)
where K = 0.1 characterizes the amplitude noise to allow irrational decisions [5, 57].
In this research, we also consider the scenario in which agents do not make irrational
choices in the strategy updating process (Equation 1), i.e., the agent x only considers
copying y if Uy > Ux.
After the agent x updates its strategy, Ux is recalculated, and x considers moving
to a random empty site (if any) in its neighbourhood with probability:
W =
1
1 + e(ux−vx)/K
(2)
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where K = 0.1, ux = Ux/kx is the agent x’s average utility, kx is the number of active
neighbours in x’s neighbourhood, and vx = (ux +
∑
y∈Ωx uy)/(kx + 1) is the average
utility of x’s neighbourhood including itself. Thus, the agents that are performing
worse (better) than their neighbours have more (less) incentive to move.
Note that to make this research comparable with previous works, we consider the
absolute payoff during the strategy imitation process (Equation 1). Nevertheless, it is
noteworthy that our key results remain unchanged qualitatively if we apply a degree-
normalized payoff in this function. However, in the case of mobility, the application
of an absolute payoff in Equation 2 would cause an artifact effect. More precisely, it
would result in the erosion of a cooperative cluster because agents at the periphery,
who have fewer neighbours, would always be unsatisfied and move, i.e., the mentioned
cluster would shrink gradually.
In order to avoid finite size effects, results are obtained for different network sizes,
ranging from M = 200 to M = 1000. Simulations are run for a sufficiently long
relaxation time (105 or 106 MC steps), where the final level of each strategy is obtained
by averaging the last 104 MC steps.
3. Results
In this section, we present some of the relevant experimental results obtained when
simulating a population of agents playing the voluntary prisoner’s dilemma (VPD)
game on diluted square lattice networks, i.e., a coevolutionary model where not only the
agents’ strategies but also their positions evolve over time. Firstly, we consider the case
in which the population is fully populated, i.e., density ρ = 1, and we demonstrate that
the emergence of cyclic dominance in the VPD game is sensitive to the chosen dynamical
rule because by using other imitation rules the cyclic dominance can be broken easily.
Secondly, we investigate the case in which ρ < 1 (diluted network), where we show
that mobility and dilution can repair the mechanisms necessary for supporting cyclic
dominance. Thirdly, we further investigate the micro-level evolutionary dynamics for a
diluted network both with and without mobility.
3.1. Fully populated network (ρ = 1): fragile cyclic dominance
In order to validate our coevolutionary model and provide grounds to explore the effects
of mobility on a diluted square lattice, we start by investigating how the population
evolves when there is no space for the agents to move. Figure 1 (upper panel) features
the time course of the average frequency of each pure strategy, i.e., cooperation, defection
and abstention, for a density ρ = 1, temptation to defect b = 1.4, and the loner’s
payoff σ = 0.5. The lower panel of Figure 1 shows the typical spatial patterns of the
strategies at different Monte Carlo steps. Note that as ρ = 1, the model collapses to the
traditional and well-known scenario in which only the strategies evolve. As expected,
the results are qualitatively the same as those reported in previous studies [10, 47].
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In this case the three strategies coexist because of the emergence of cyclic dominance
behaviour where defectors beat cooperators, cooperators beat abstainers, and abstainers
beat defectors [19, 20, 58].
Figure 1. Time course of the average frequency of cooperation (blue), defection (red)
and abstention (green) for a fully populated network (density ρ = 1) with N = 4002
agents, temptation to defect b = 1.4, and loner’s payoff σ = 0.5 (top panel). Typical
evolution of spatial distribution of the strategies (bottom panel). Results are obtained
for the case in which agents are allowed to make irrational decisions, i.e., applies the
noisy Fermi-Dirac imitation rule (Eq. 1) for any value of Uy and Ux.
To gain deeper insights into the mechanisms which underlie the cyclic dominance
behaviour in the context of a spatial voluntary prisoner’s dilemma game, we perform
the same experiments as above but for the case in which an agent (x) only considers
copying the opponent’s strategy if the opponent (y) is performing better than itself, i.e.,
applies the Fermi-Dirac distribution function (Equation 1) if and only if the utility of y
is greater than the utility of x, Uy > Ux. Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that when this
simple modification in microscopic dynamics is imposed, the cyclic dominance behaviour
is broken and the population converges to a frozen state where only defection and
abstention are present, but the cooperator strategy becomes extinct. Note that the
idea of employing different imitation rules such as Equation 1 for both rational and
irrational decisions have been systematically investigated in previous studies for two-
strategy games [36, 59, 60], and it is well-known that different imitation rules, as well
as the adoption of different values of K (amplitude noise) in the Fermi-Dirac rule may
affect the outcome [57]. However, there is an unexplored gap in the literature regarding
the possible consequences of the adoption of the Fermi-Dirac rule in the context of the
VPD game, and our results suggest that the cyclic behaviour commonly associated with
the VPD game may be related to the use of this function, which also supports strategy
change when the utility values are equal.
Figure 3 depicts the average frequency of the three strategies (C, D and A) in
the full b − σ plane when agents are allowed to make irrational (top panels) and
rational (bottom panels) decisions. Note that while cyclic dominance is maintained
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Figure 2. Time course of the average frequency of cooperation (blue), defection (red)
and abstention (green) for a fully populated network (density ρ = 1) with N = 4002
agents, temptation to defect b = 1.4, and loner’s payoff σ = 0.5 (top panel). Typical
evolution of spatial distribution of the strategies (bottom panel). Results are obtained
for the case in which agents make rational decisions only, i.e., applies the Fermi-Dirac
imitation rule (Eq. 1) if and only if Uy > Ux. As compared to Fig. 1, note that cyclic
dominance is quickly broken and cooperators die out soon because of the slight change
in the imitation rule.
for almost any combinations of b and σ values in the traditional case (top), the same
does not occur when the imitation rule is slightly changed (bottom). Thus, contrary to
previous observations, our results highlight that the use of noisy imitation, dictated by
Equation 1, is an essential condition for promoting cyclic behaviour in the context of
the VPD game. The reason for this discrepancy can be summarized as follows:
• Considering a random initial population (see the early MC steps in Figures 1 and 2),
the typical trajectory predicts the advantage of defectors which is then followed by
the rise of abstainers or both cases.
• Next, checking (or not) for the Uy > Ux condition can be decisive to allow (or not)
the subsequent rise of cooperators, which in turn supports the cyclic dominance
phenomenon seen in Figure 1.
• At a micro level, if one cooperator/defector (x) is mostly surrounded by abstainers
(y), its utility Ux will be mostly equal to Uy. Remember that in the voluntary
prisoner’s dilemma game, if one or two agents abstain (A), both will get the same
loner’s payoff σ, i.e., for any pair of strategies CA, AC, DA, AD, AA both agents
get an identical σ value.
Thus, if we impose the Uy > Ux condition, as the utilities of x and y are the same, the
population is not able to curb the spreading of abstainers, which consequently produces
the pattern observed in Figure 2, i.e., a few isolated defectors stuck in a sea of abstainers.
Otherwise, if Equation 1 is applied for any value of Ux−Uy, as the number of abstainers
increase, W will be approximately equal to 0.5 for most agents, which is one of the main
mechanisms to keep the three strategies alive as observed in Figure 1.
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Figure 3. Heat maps of the average frequency of the strategies in the full b− σ plane
at the stationary state for a fully populated network (density ρ = 1). Results for the
noisy imitation rule on the top, and for exclusive rational imitation rule on the bottom
row. Note that while cyclic dominance is maintained for almost any combination of b
and σ values on the top, this behaviour is easily broken when changing the imitation
rule to “only copy if the opponent is performing better” (bottom). In the latter case
abstention becomes the dominant strategy for most b− σ pairs.
3.2. Diluted network (ρ < 1): recovering cyclic dominance and promoting cooperation
As we already argued, a fully occupied interaction graph seems to be a specific rather
than a generally valid real life situation, hence this section discusses the coevolutionary
cases for a diluted lattice network where not only the strategies but also the agents’
positions evolve over time.
At a macro-level, we start by analysing the influence of the density ρ on the
evolutionary process for the noisy Equation 1 (i.e., agents are allowed to make irrational
decisions) after a sufficiently long relaxation time. In line with previous research for two-
strategy games such as the prisoner’s dilemma game [32, 34, 61], experiments with our
coevolutionary model reveal that mobility and dilution also play a key role in promoting
cooperation in the VPD game. Figure 4 shows the average frequency of the three
strategies in the full b− σ plane for some representative densities. As compared to the
traditional case (ρ = 1.0 regime i.e., Figure 3 top), we observe that the cyclic dominance
behaviour still emerges for most b− σ settings for ρ ≥ 0.59. Interestingly, results show
that scenarios of full cooperation arise monotonously when ρ < 0.59, i.e., the more
diluted the network is, the easier it is for cooperators to dominate the population.
However, when the density is too low (ρ < 0.10) the cooperators become too vulnerable
to invasion by abstainers due to the increasing difficulty of forming clusters. Also,
experiments show that 0.10 ≥ ρ > 0.05 quickly produces very unstable C + A states
which either converge to full C or full A. Notably, this behavior cannot be seen directly
Mobility restores the mechanism which supports cooperation 8
from the heat map because the average of full C and full A destinations results in
around 0.5 density for both strategies. The latter may also suggest a coexistence of
these strategies, but as we stressed, not in the present case because either C or A
prevails at these global concentration values. Furthermore, when ρ ≤ 0.05 cooperators
always die out and abstainers dominate in all scenarios.
Figure 4. Heat maps of the average frequency of cooperation (top), defection (middle)
and abstention (bottom) in the full b − σ plane at the stationary state for a diluted
network. All results are obtained for the noisy imitation rule. Note that at ρ = 0.10
global concentration, the average frequencies of C and A are approximately 0.5 as a
result of a bistable destination of the evolutionary process, where the population either
converges to full dominance of cooperators or abstainers.
Note that the percolation threshold (ρp) for this square lattice network with von
Neumann neighbourhood is approximately equal to 0.59 [62, 63]. Thus, this result
is of particular interest because cooperation is favoured when the density is below
the percolation threshold, which is known to be an adverse situation for maintaining
cooperation [27, 29, 30]. Moreover, results in Figure 4 also highlight the importance of
exploring the outcomes of the VPD game across the whole loner’s payoff (σ) spectrum,
and not only for a specific σ = 0.3 value, as was used earlier [10, 47].
Considering the discrepancy observed in Figure 3 for ρ = 1, we now repeat the same
experiments as above but for the case where an agent only applies Equation 1 if the
opponent is performing better than itself, i.e., the case of a fully rational imitation rule.
Surprisingly, Figure 5 shows that the previously observed difference for both imitation
rules diminishes when we consider a diluted network (ρ < 1) with mobile agents. More
importantly, results show that when 1 > ρ > ρp the mechanisms which support cyclic
dominance in the traditional case (i.e., for the noisy Equation 1 and ρ = 1) are recovered
for a wide range of b − σ scenarios. In fact, results for both imitation rules and ρ < 1
are qualitatively the same for most settings. However, as seen in figures 4 and 5, when
the density is below the percolation threshold ρ < ρp, it is possible to observe a small
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shift of ρ ≈ 0.05 in the boundaries of the region in which full C occurs. For instance,
results for ρ = 0.15 in Figure 4 are similar to those when ρ = 0.10 in Figure 5. Note
that the bistable outcomes, where the population either converges to a full C or a full
A state, observed for ρ ≈ 0.10 in the first case happens at ρ ≈ 0.05 in the later case.
Figure 5. Heat maps of the average frequency of cooperation (top), defection (middle)
and abstention (bottom) in the whole b− σ plane at the stationary state for a diluted
network. All results are for the fully rational imitation rule.
3.3. Micro-level analysis of the effects of dilution and mobility
In order to further explore the aforementioned phenomena, we extend our analysis of the
evolutionary process to a micro perspective. Figure 6 shows the average time course of
the three strategies for a fixed temptation to defect b = 1.65 and loner’s payoff σ = 0.55,
which is representative of the outcomes of other parameters as well. For this scenario,
when ρ = 1, cyclic dominance is maintained for the traditional case with the noisy
imitation rule, but it is easily shattered when considering a rational rule. However, the
difference diminishes when ρ < 1.
Results show that the profile of the curves for the initial 102 MC steps are very
similar to scenarios which support cyclic dominance, i.e., an initial drop followed by a
quick recovery of the frequency of cooperators. This phenomenon has also been observed
in previous work for dynamic networks [48, 64], where it was discussed that defectors
are quickly dominated by abstainers, allowing a few clusters of cooperators to remain
in the population, then with the lack of defectors, those cooperative clusters expand by
invading the abstainers. Note that it also explains the reason that higher values of σ are
more beneficial in promoting cooperation (as seen in Figures 3, 4 and 5), i.e., abstainers
have to be strong enough to protect cooperators against invasion from defectors in the
initial steps. Moreover, Figure 6 (right) shows a clear correlation between the density ρ
and the speed of the initial inflation of abstention.
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Figure 6. Time course of the average frequency of cooperation (left), defection
(center) and abstention (right) for different densities ρ, temptation to defect b = 1.65,
and loner’s payoff σ = 0.55. Results for the noisy imitation rule on the top, and the
rational imitation rule on the bottom. Note that the difference between both rules
diminishes when ρ < 1.
In order to distinguish between the impact of mobility and dilution on the emergence
of cooperative behaviour and cyclic dominance, we have also investigated the case
in which the agents are not allowed to move. That is, the same model described in
Section 2, but without the movement updating process. As shown in Figure 7, when
ρ ≤ ρp the frequency in which the agents change their strategies is extremely low,
i.e., the population quickly reaches a frozen pattern which is very dependent on the
initial configuration. Also, in line with preceding research [29, 30], we observe that
when considering the traditional noisy imitation rule (Figure 7 top), dilution alone can
improve the level of cooperation, where the optimal value of ρ is always above the
percolation threshold (1 > ρ > ρp). In another perspective, the emergence of cyclic
dominance behaviour is diminished when the agents do not move (e.g., compare the top
panels of the Figures 6 and 7).
Interestingly, different phenomena occur when we consider the fully rational
imitation rule (Figure 7 bottom). Note that dilution alone is not able to fix the
evolutionary mechanisms which support either the emergence of cyclic dominance and
the evolution of cooperation. In other words, results show that mobility plays a key role
in diminishing the difference on the outcomes of both imitation rules (as seen in Figure 6
for ρ < 1). Moreover, it is noteworthy that mobility allows for the full dominance of
cooperation for lower values of ρ, as well as the robust emergence of cyclic dominance
for a wider range of scenarios.
To advance the understanding of mobility and dilution in the context of the VPD
game, we also analyse the spatio-temporal dynamics of the strategies for both the noisy
and the rational imitation rules. Figure 8 provides an animation for a prepared initial
state where the strategies are arranged in stripes. This prepared configuration allows
us to separate cooperators from defectors, making it easier to observe the mechanisms
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which are responsible for breaking the cyclic chain where A beats D, D beats C and C
beats A. In summary, results show that the key difference between the dynamical rules
is that, when applying the fully rational rule, defectors in the middle of abstainers do not
have the incentive to become abstainers. Hence, as discussed in Section 3.1, the rational
rule produces frozen D + A states (as seen in Figure 2) which cannot be observed in
the noisy Fermi-Dirac case. As a consequence, the isolated defectors trapped in the sea
of abstainers inhibit the formation of larger cooperative clusters, which in turn breaks
the cyclic chain. However, when mobility is introduced for ρ < 1, the D + A states are
not a stable phase anymore. Here, there is a small stir which causes a random drift
of defectors. Consequently, when two defectors meet they become vulnerable against
invasion from abstainers. This process would lead to a homogeneous A phase, but the
latter is sensitive to the attack of cooperators. In this way, abstainers are now able to
support the emergence of cooperation, which in turn restores the mechanism to maintain
the coexistence of all competing strategies.
Figure 7. Time course of the average frequency of cooperation (left), defection
(center) and abstention (right) for different densities ρ, temptation to defect b = 1.65,
and loner’s payoff σ = 0.55. Results obtained for a diluted network without mobility.
The panels compare the noisy imitation rule (top) and the rational imitation rule
(bottom).
Furthermore, regarding the phenomenon of cyclic dominance observed when
ρ < 1.0, although using a different scenario and methodology, our results are compatible
with previous research concerning mobility in the rock-paper-scissors game, where it is
discussed that mobility can jeopardise cyclic dominance [25, 65]. However, in the context
of the VPD game, the enhancement of cooperation for ρ < ρp is counter-intuitive because
it diminishes the cooperators’ ability to form larger clusters [47]. Besides, results show
that when the agents are allowed to abstain, the population of mobile agents will never
converge to full defection. Finally, it is noteworthy that results also echo the findings of
previous research concerning the PD and VPD games on weighted networks [48, 50, 51],
i.e., a coevolutionary model in which the link weights are also subject to evolution. In
parallel, the ability of avoiding interactions either by weakening the link weight or by
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moving to another position acts as an important mechanism to strengthen cooperators
against exploitation.
Figure 8. Snapshots of the spatial evolution of cooperation (blue), defection (red)
and abstention (green) in the final stationary state with different scenarios. All
simulations run for the same loner’s payoff σ = 0.55, and temptation to defect
b = 1.65. Results for the noisy imitation rule on the top, and the fully rational
imitation rule on the bottom. An animation of the evolution of the strategies is
provided (https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.8038988).
4. Discussion and Conclusions
This work investigates the role of mobility and dilution in a population of agents playing
the voluntary prisoner’s dilemma (VPD) game, also known as the optional prisoner’s
dilemma game, in a diluted square lattice network. We propose a coevolutionary model
where both the agents’ strategy and position are subject to evolution. In this model, in
addition to the commonly applied imitation rules for the strategies [10], we also adopt a
mobility rule in which agents who are performing worse (better) than their neighbours
have more (less) chance to move. Thus, without loss of simplicity, this coevolutionary
and asynchronous model is more realistic than the previous ones which consider random
mobility with synchronous updating rules [47].
Research in this domain has claimed that the addition of abstention in the
prisoner’s dilemma game leads to a rock-paper-scissors type game, in which cooperation
dominates abstention, abstention dominates defection, and defection, in turn,
dominates cooperation, which describes the so-called cyclic dominance behaviour [19].
Interestingly, the present study shows that, in the context of the traditional VPD
game for a fully populated network [10], the emergence of cyclic behaviour is biased
by the use of the Fermi-Dirac distribution function (sigmoid) in the strategy adoption
process. This sigmoid function is often employed to allow for irrational or unjustified
decisions where agents occasionally copy the strategy of a worse or an equally performing
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neighbour [5, 57, 66, 67, 68]. We show that when agents make fully rational decisions
such as only copying the strategy of better performing neighbours, the outcome changes
drastically, making cyclic behaviour unsustainable in most cases. However, the present
study shows that the mechanism that supports cyclic behaviour is fixed when agents
are allowed to move due to a diluted interaction space.
In fact, the noisy strategy updating rule has been applied to avoid artifact or frozen
outcomes. However, in the present study we show that it is also possible to avoid such
frozen states in a more realistic way, where, for instance, agents are allowed to move
and change their connections over time. Hence, a deterministic rule can be as efficient
as the noisy Fermi-Dirac function if we assume a partly diluted system. Furthermore,
by means of robust and systematic Monte Carlo simulations, results show that mobility
plays a crucial role in promoting cooperation in the VPD game for a wide range of
values of the temptation to defect b, and loner’s payoff σ, including for scenarios of high
b and density below the percolation threshold ρ < ρp, which are known to be adverse
for maintaining cooperative behaviour [27, 29, 30].
To conclude, this paper aims to bridge the gap between agent mobility and the
concept of voluntary/optional participation in social dilemmas. In addition, it provides
a novel perspective for understanding the foundations of cyclic dominance behaviour in
the context of the prisoner’s dilemma game with voluntary participation (VPD game).
We hope this work can serve as a basis for further research on the role of abstention
to advance the understanding of the evolution of cooperation in coevolutionary spatial
games.
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